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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

 _________________

 JOHN DOE,

 Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEXSEARCH.COM, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Case No. 07-4182
 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo.
 No. 07-00604—Jack Zouhary, District Judge. Argued: October 24, 2008 Decided and Filed:
 December 30, 2008 Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; MERRITT and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

 _________________

 COUNSEL

 ARGUED: Dean Boland, Lakewood, Ohio, for Appellant. Gary J. Kaufman, Pro Hoc Vice,  
 KAUFMAN LAW GROUP, Los Angeles, California, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Dean
 Boland, Lakewood, Ohio, for Appellant. Gary J. Kaufman, Colin A. Hardacre, Dana S.
 Milmeister, Pro Hoc Vice, KAUFMAN LAW GROUP, Los Angeles, California, Richard
 Marvin Kerger, KERGER & HARTMAN, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellees. Michael B.Bressman,
 VANDERBILT LEGAL CLINIC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Amici Curiae.

 1

 No. 07-4182 John Doe v. SexSearch.com Page 2

 _________________

 OPINION

 _________________

 MERRITT, Circuit Judge. Pseudonymous plaintiff John Doe appeals the dismissal of his
 complaint against defendant, SexSearch.com (“SexSearch”), an online adult dating service that
 facilitates sexual encounters between its members. Doe used SexSearch to meet Jane Roe, who
 described herself as an eighteen-year-old female. The two met and had sexual relations. Roe, it
 turned out, was actually fourteen years old, and Doe was consequently arrested and charged
 with three counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. In an unusual case of first impression,
 Doe then filed suit against SexSearch, alleging an array of violations under Ohio law, most of
 which are variations on the claim that SexSearch is at fault for Doe’s sexual relationship with a
 minor and the harm that resulted from his arrest. The district court dismissed all fourteen causes
 of action under Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In the alternative, the district
 court held that eight of the fourteen causes of action were also barred by the Communications
 Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. Because we agree with the district court that Doe’s complaint
 failed to state a claim, we do not reach the question of whether the Communications Decency
 Act provides SexSearch with immunity from suit. We do not adopt the district court’s discussion
 of the Act, which would read § 230 more broadly than any previous Court of Appeals decision
 has read it, potentially abrogating all state- or common-law causes of action brought against
 interactive Internet services. We do not have before us any issue concerning the criminal liability
 of the parties or the voidability of contracts for sexual services.

 I.
 SexSearch is an “online adult dating service.” Its members use the website to meet one another
 for sexual encounters. In October 2005, John Doe became a “Gold Member” of SexSearch,
 which required him to pay $29.95 per month and agree to the site’s Terms and Conditions,
 including a promise on Doe’s behalf that he was at least eighteen years old. Using the service,
 Doe met Jane Roe, who likewise had become a “Gold Member” after agreeing to SexSearch’s
 Terms and Conditions and warranting that she was at least eighteen.

 In her profile, she stated that she was born June 15, 1987. After meeting online, Roe invited Doe
 to her home on November 15, 2005, at which point they had sexual relations. At some point
 thereafter, Roe, who was actually fourteen, told the police about her encounter with Doe. On
 December 30, 2005, police surrounded Doe’s home, arrested him, and charged him with three
 counts of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, a third-degree felony. For reasons
 that are unclear, the charges were later dismissed and Doe’s records were sealed. Doe claims,
 however, that the arrest and prosecution — and the publicity that accompanied them — caused
 lasting harm to his reputation, family life, and employment prospects. Based on this harm, Doe
 filed suit against fifteen corporate and individual defendants, whom he believed were the owners
 of SexSearch. The complaint contained fourteen causes of action, which, as the district court
 noted, “boil down to either (a) Defendants failed to discover [that] Jane Roe lied about her age to
 join the website, or (b) the contract terms are unconscionable.” Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F.
 Supp. 2d 719, 724 (N.D. Ohio 2007). Defendants then filed motions to dismiss for lack of
 personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. For the sake of judicial economy,
 defendant/intervenor Cytek, Ltd., which claims to be the true owner of SexSearch, agreed to
 enter an appearance and waive all issues related to service of process and personal jurisdiction
 so that the court could consider the 12(b)(6) motion before undertaking the time-consuming task
 of evaluating personal jurisdiction for each remaining defendant. The district court granted the
 motion to dismiss, concluding that Doe had failed to state a claim as to each of the fourteen
 causes of action and, in the alternative, concluding that many of the claims were barred by the
 Communications Decency Act. This appeal followed.

 II.
 We review the district court’s judgment de novo. Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332
 (6th Cir. 2008). We construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
 accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true to determine whether the moving party is
 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co.,
 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). While our analysis primarily focuses on the complaint, “
 matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached
 to the complaint . . . may be taken into account.” Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502
 (6th Cir. 2001). As noted above, we do not adopt the district court’s analysis of the
 Communications Decency Act and explicitly reserve the question of its scope for another day.
 We do, however, affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss Doe’s complaint for failure to
 state a claim. Count One alleges that SexSearch breached its contract with Doe by permitting
 minors to become members of its service. Under Ohio law, to prove breach of contract, a
 plaintiff must prove that (1) a contract existed; (2) plaintiff fulfilled his obligations; (3) defendant
 failed to fulfill his obligations; and (4) damages resulted from this failure. Lawrence v. Lorian
 County Cmty Coll., 713 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). A contract between Doe and
 SexSearch was formed when Doe checked a box indicating that he was over eighteen and had
 read and agreed to SexSearch’s Terms and Conditions and privacy policy. The Terms and
 Conditions constitute the content of the contract. Doe alleges that SexSearch failed to fulfill its
 obligations by “permitt[ing] minors to become paid members” and by “deliver[ing] a minor to
 Plaintiff for the purpose of sexual relations.” Compl. ¶¶ 296-97, J.A. at 46. But the Terms and
 Conditions state that SexSearch “cannot guarantee, and assume[s] no responsibility for verifying,
 the accuracy of the information provided by other users of the Service.” The contract requires
 that members be “eighteen or over to register,” but nowhere does SexSearch promise to prevent
 minors from registering or to monitor members’ profiles for accuracy. Therefore, the complaint
 does not state a breach-of- contract claim because Doe has not alleged that SexSearch has
 breached any promise that is actually part of the contract. Count Two alleges that SexSearch
 fraudulently represented that “all persons on its site are ‘18+’ years of age,” and that it “verifies
 all members profiles prior to posting.” Compl. ¶¶ 301, 302, J.A. at 47. This allegation stems from
 a warning on SexSearch stating that “all persons within this site are 18+.” To state a claim of
 fraud, plaintiff must allege: (a) a representation (b) that is material to the transaction at hand, (c)
 made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, (d) with the intent of misleading another into relying
 upon it, (e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment, and (f) a resulting injury
 proximately caused by the reliance. Orbit Elecs., Inc. v. Helm Instrument Co., 855 N.E.2d 91,
 100 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). The most obvious deficiency comes from the requirement of justifiable
 reliance upon the representation. As noted, the Terms and Conditions expressly disclaim
 responsibility for verifying members’ ages. They also state that no “information, whether oral or
 written, obtained by you from SexSearch or through or from [sic] SexSearch shall create any
 warranty not expressly stated in the TAC.” Furthermore, having registered for the site himself,
 Doe knew that SexSearch merely required a user to check a box stating that he or she is at least
 eighteen, with no corroborating evidence required from the user and no attempt at verification
 made by SexSearch. As a result, there could be no justifiable reliance on the warning, and thus
 Count Two does not state a claim for fraudulent representation. Count Three alleges that
 SexSearch negligently inflicted emotional distress by failing to remove Roe’s profile from its
 website. To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law, the plaintiff
 must allege that he was aware of real physical danger to himself or another. See King v.
 Bogner, 624 N.E.2d 364, 367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); see also Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d
 664, 669 (Ohio 1995) (Ohio courts have limited “recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
 distress to instances where the plaintiff has either witnessed or experienced a dangerous accident
 or appreciated the actual physical peril”). Doe’s alleged injuries result from embarrassment and
 harm to social standing and employment prospects; he does not allege that he experienced a
 dangerous accident or appreciated actual physical peril and, consequently, has not stated a claim
 for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Wigfall v. Society Nat’l Bank, 669 N.E.2d 313
 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (affirming trial court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on
 plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, where defendant falsely accused
 plaintiff of robbing a bank, resulting in plaintiff’s arrest and interrogation and the publication of his
 photograph). Count Four alleges negligent misrepresentation based on the warning that all
 members of SexSearch are adults. A defendant is liable for negligent misrepresentation if he (1)
 supplies false information (2) for the guidance of others in their business transactions (3) causing
 pecuniary loss to the plaintiff (4) while the plaintiff justifiably relied upon the information (5) and
 the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
 the information. Delman v. City of Cleveland Heights, 534 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio 1989).
 Courts have also recognized that a claim for negligent misrepresentation requires “a special
 relationship under which the defendant supplied information to the plaintiff for the latter’s
 guidance in its business transaction.” Ziegler v. Findlay Indus., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 733, 738
 (N.D. Ohio 2006). The information at issue in this case was not supplied to guide others in their
 business transactions; nor is Doe complaining about any pecuniary losses; nor (as noted) was his
 reliance justifiable; nor has he alleged any “special relationship” between himself and SexSearch.
 Therefore he has failed to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Count Five alleges a
 breach of warranty, likewise based on the same warning about users being over eighteen. Under
 Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.26,“[a]ny affirmation of  fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
 which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
 warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.” The section only applies to
 the sale of goods, not to services. See Brown v. Christopher Inn Co., 344 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (holding that § 1302.26 does not apply when there is no sale of goods, as defined by
 the Uniform Commercial Code). Because SexSearch is a service and Doe has not alleged that
 the dispute concerns the sale of goods, he has not stated a claim for breach of warranty. Counts
 Six through Ten allege violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Counts Six and
 Seven allege deceptive trade practices in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.02. When
 determining whether an act or practice is deceptive, the court views the incident from the
 consumer’s standpoint. Chestnut v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 850 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ohio Ct.
 App. 2006). “The basic test is one of fairness; the act need not rise to the level of fraud,
 negligence, or breach of contract.” Id. “Furthermore, a deceptive act has the likelihood of
 inducing a state of mind in the consumer that is not in accord with the facts.” Id. Here, there was
 no likelihood that SexSearch’s warning that all users are over eighteen would induce a state of
 mind in Doe that was not in accord with the facts. He had agreed to the Terms and Conditions,
 which state that SexSearch is not responsible for verifying users’ ages, and had gone through the
 registration process himself and thus knew that SexSearch took no steps to check the accuracy
 of users’ promises that they are eighteen. Because the warning was not deceptive, when viewed
 from Doe’s perspective,  Counts Six and Seven do not state a claim for deceptive sales practices.
 Counts Eight through Ten allege unconscionable acts in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.03,
 which states: “No supplier shall commit an unconscionable act or practice in connection with a
 consumer transaction.” Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.03(A). When determining whether an act is
 unconscionable, a court should consider, among other things, “[w]hether the supplier required the
 consumer to enter into a consumer transaction on terms the supplier knew were substantially
 one-sided in favor of the supplier.” Id. § 1345.03(B)(5). The allegedly unconscionable acts at
 issue here are  the inclusion of: a clause limiting damages to the amount of the contract (Count
 Eight), a clause allowing SexSearch to cancel the contract at any time (Count Nine), and
 unspecified clauses that are substantially one-sided (Count Ten). Limitation-of-liability clauses
 are viewed critically, but may be freely bargained for in Ohio and will be enforced “‘[a]bsent
 important public policy concerns, unconscionability, or vague and ambiguous terms.’” Nahra v.
 Honeywell, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 962, 969 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (quoting Collins v. Click Camera &
 Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). A SexSearch gold membership costs
 $29.95 per month. Given the nature of the service, which encourages members to meet in person
 for sexual encounters, SexSearch’s potential liability is nearly limitless. For example, arrest,
 diseases of various sorts, and injuries caused by irate family members or others may be the result
 of such hedonistic sex. When selling such services, then, it is commercially reasonable for
 SexSearch to limit its liability to the price of the contract. See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. ADT
 Sec. Sys., 1995 WL 461316 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1995) (upholding as commercially reasonable
 and not unconscionable or substantially one-sided a limitation-of-liability clause that tied liability to
 the contract price). The case that Doe relies on for the proposition that a limitation of liability
 violates the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act is an unpublished consent decree that merely
 states that the defendants in that case had improperly included a limitation-of-liability clause; it
 does not suggest that such clauses are always unconscionable. State, ex rel. Montgomery v.
 Thermal Seal, Inc., 2001 WL 1841771 (Ohio Com. Pl. Sep. 18, 2001). The clause at issue is not
 unconscionable within the meaning of § 1345.03(A) and so Count Eight does not state a claim for
 relief. SexSearch’s right to cancel, which Doe describes as “unilateral,” is likewise not  unconscionable. Members may cancel at any time; they must do so at least three days before the
 next monthly billing cycle to avoid being charged for the next month, and they will not receive a
 refund unless unusual circumstances apply. But those conditions hardly amount to a unilateral
 right to cancel on SexSearch’s behalf. And when SexSearch does cancel a paid membership, it
 will provide “a pro-rata refund for the unexpired period of the cancelled month’s membership by
 automatic credit.” Furthermore, SexSearch’s power to cancel memberships is presumably
 designed to protect members from those who have violated the Terms and Conditions or posted
 false content. Therefore the right to cancel is not unconscionable within the meaning of §
 1345.03(A) and so Count Nine does not state a claim for relief. Count Ten does not specify
 which clauses are so substantially one-sided as to rise to the level of unconscionability, but a
 review of the Terms and Conditions does not turn up any candidates, and thus the dismissal of
 Count Ten should also be affirmed.

 Counts Eleven through Thirteen allege common-law unconscionability in the Terms and
 Conditions. At common law, unconscionability is a defense against enforcement, not a basis for
 recovering damages. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (“If a
 contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to
 enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
 term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
 result.”); Bennet v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 698, 700 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (“[T]he equitable
 theory of unconscionability has never been utilized to allow for the affirmative recovery of money
 damages.”); Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust 2001- 4, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16, 36
 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages under the common law doctrine
 of unconscionability.”). If Doe were seeking a declaratory judgment or reformation of the
 contract, unconscionability could form the basis of a cause of action. See Johnson, 451 F. Supp.
 2d at 36. But he is not requesting either of these remedies, nor would either do him any good.
 While we agree with the district court’s analysis of why Counts Eleven through Thirteen fail to
 satisfy the two-prong showing of procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability,
 see Doe, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 734-36, we note that it is unnecessary to analyze these elements
 here, since the doctrine itself is inapplicable. Finally, Count Fourteen alleges that SexSearch failed
 to warn Doe that a minor may be a member of the service. A failure-to-warn claim requires (1)
 a duty to warn, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) injury proximately resulting from the breach.
 Freas v. Prater Contsr. Corp., 573 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ohio 1991). Where the danger is open and
 obvious, there is no duty to warn. Livengood v. ABS Contractors Supply, 710 N.E.2d 770, 772
 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). “Where only one conclusion can be drawn from the established facts, the
 issue of whether a risk was open and obvious may be decided by the court as a matter of law.”
 Klauss v. Glassman, 2005 WL 678984 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2005). A risk is considered
 open and obvious when its “dangers are within the body of knowledge common to the
 community” and “ generally known and recognized by the ordinary consumer.” Gawloski v.
 Miller Brewing Co., 644 N.E.2d 731, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). In this case, the danger that
 a member of SexSearch could be a minor is open and obvious. Internet users’ anonymity and
 potential for false personal representations are well known. Doe was familiar with the
 registration process and knew that SexSearch did nothing more than asking members to check a
 box indicating that they are at least eighteen. Furthermore, even if there was a duty to warn, the
 statement in the Terms and Conditions that SexSearch could not verify members’ information
 could be seen as a satisfaction of that duty. Therefore, Doe has failed to state a claim for failure
 to warn.

 III.

 We, therefore, AFFIRM the district court’s judgment dismissing Doe’s complaint for
 failure to state a claim.
 

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